Hirschman’s Ideas as Evaluation Tools by Picciotto, Robert





	   Journal	  of	  MultiDisciplinary	  Evaluation	  













Background:	   Albert	   O.	   Hirschman,	   one	   of	   the	   most	  
distinguished	   social	   scientist	   of	   the	   past	   half	   century,	   is	   not	  
widely	   known	   within	   the	   evaluation	   community.	   Yet	   he	  
practiced	   the	  art	  of	  evaluation	  without	  acknowledging	   it	  and	  
the	   influential	   concepts	   that	   he	   generated	   are	   extremely	  
valuable	  as	  evaluation	  tools.	  
	  
Purpose:	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  article	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  by	  dint	  
of	  example	  of	  example	   that	  Hirschman’s	   ideas	   illuminate	   the	  
development	   experience;	   inform	   evaluation	   methods	   and	  
have	  potential	  as	  guides	  to	  evaluation	  practice.	  
	  
Setting:	   Hirschman’s	  unique	   intellectual	  contributions	  to	  our	  
understanding	   of	   society	   have	   recently	   been	   recognized	   in	   a	  
flurry	  of	  publications	  that	  followed	  his	  death	  in	  2012.	  	  
	  
Intervention:	  This	  article	  did	  not	  require	  an	  intervention.	  
	  
Research	   Design:	   Three	   popular	   Hirschman	   concepts	   are	  
dissected	   and	   used	   to	   explore	   a	   variety	   of	   evaluation	   policy	  
issues.	  
	  
Data	  Collection	  and	  Analysis:	  Not	  applicable.	  	  
	  
Findings:	   Hirschman’s	  mental	   constructs	   are	   interconnected;	  
throw	  new	  light	  on	  evaluation	  criteria	  and	  can	  be	  used	  to	  get	  
the	  most	  out	  of	  the	  evaluation	  function	  in	  diverse	  authorizing	  
environments.	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  theory;	  economics.	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“In dealing with the multiple and complex 
problems of development we have learnt that we 
must fashion generalizations at all kinds of 
ranges and be deaf, like Ulysses, to the seductive 
chant of the unique paradigm” (Hirschman, 1995, 
p.116). 
 
Albert O. Hirschman, one of the most 
influential and original thinker of his generation, 
died in December 2012. He left behind a 
prodigious and elegant oeuvre that is hard to 
categorize since it spans disciplines, crosses 
borders, mixes mental constructs, rejects dogmas 
and reaches out beyond the academy to decision 
makers and the wider public.   
 
Who	  is	  Albert	  O.	  Hirschman?	  	  
 
Hirschman has been labeled one of the most 
distinguished social scientist of the past half-
century, an original development thinker, a master 
essayist and a worldly philosopher. He is all of 
these things but he is also an evaluation pioneer.  
Let me disclose at the outset that Hirschman 
rejected out of hand my efforts to recruit him as a 
member of our fledgling profession. He considered 
the notion far-fetched if not impertinent when he 
commented on a draft essay that extolled the 
evaluative dimensions of his writings.  But I stood 
by my assessment which was included in a book 
designed not only to celebrate but also to contest 
and challenge Hirschman’s ideas (Rodwin and 
Schon, 1994).  
A year earlier, I had discovered that 
Hirschman was equally hostile to the notion of a 
distinctive ‘Hirschman doctrine’.  When, as a 
newly appointed Director General of the World 
Bank Independent Evaluation Group, I asked him 
for names of individuals who might help promote 
his distinctive approach to the assessment of 
development interventions within the World Bank 
he wrote back: “Unfortunately (or, I rather tend to 
think, fortunately) there is no Hirschman school 
of economic development and I cannot point to a 
large pool of disciples where one might fish out 
someone to work with you along these lines” 
(Adelman, 2013).   
Hirschman’s resistance to being pigeon holed 
and called an evaluator is not surprising; 
evaluation is a discipline in its own right and 
Hirschman, a free spirit, made a virtue of 
trespassing across disciplinary boundaries. He 
used political science to inform economic thinking 
and experimented with economic concepts when 
faced with political dilemmas. He stoutly resisted 
the parsimony of both disciplines. He also reached 
out to psychology and sociology to uncover the 
unforeseen consequences of policy interventions. 
It is through his masterful interplay of the 
disciplines that Hirschman weaved seminal 
concepts that illuminate our understanding of 
social phenomena. By now, they have become 
common currency among development 
economists, political scientists and sociologists. In 
what follows I argue that these nuggets of wisdom 
all spring from evaluative processes.  
The evaluator’s job is to establish the rationale 
of program theories, ascertain their validity and 
draw the surprising implications that often arise in 
the systematic confrontation between theory and 
practice. This is precisely what Hirschman 
managed to do throughout the odyssey of his 
extraordinary life.  While he was trained as an 
economist and was fully able to muster equations 
and data analyses to illustrate or demolish an 
argument Hirschman was partial to down to earth 
evaluation methods. He subjected all rigid 
doctrines to judicious and subtle criticism 
grounded in his own direct observations and real 
world experience.  
Hirschman shares another characteristic with 
evaluators: his full fledged commitment to 
objective inquiry. Throughout his long career as a 
policy adviser he jousted with (and evaded capture 
by) the establishment – as well as the politically 
correct counter-establishment. He was 
unimpressed by power and status and debunked 
people who took themselves too seriously. He 
fiercely protected his independence of mind and 
appearance. Such dispositions are precisely those 
that evaluation excellence requires.  
Equally, as a policy thinker, Hirschman 
engaged in systematic self-subversion of his own 
mental models – if only to crush in the bud any 
notion that he stood for any particular school of 
thought or ideology. The readiness to recognize 
and challenge one’s own biases and go without 
hesitation where the evidence points to is also 
characteristic of bona fide evaluators.  
In terms of his research methods, just as good 
evaluation practice mandates, Hirschman 
observed events dispassionately, gathered 
evaluative information from a variety of sources 
and examined social interventions without 
preconceptions of any kind. Unlike economists 
who are prone to search for evidence that fits their 
models or confirm their grand theories he looked 
at the world without pre-determined hypotheses 
and was fond of small ideas. Similarly good 
evaluators search truth from facts and keep an 
alert eye on singularities. They appreciate that 
context matters enormously in the determination 
of outcomes and they evince deep skepticism 
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regarding intellectual schemes that seek to explain 
everything.  
Finally, Hirschman’s engagement with the 
world rather than retreat in the ivory tower of the 
academy illustrates why he was the evaluator 
“malgré lui”. He was committed to the 
freewheeling exploration of complex situations. He 
relished confrontation with decision makers. He 
embraced empirical field work, patient listening 
and thoughtful observation. Most of all he enjoyed 
travelling in the zones of turmoil and transition of 
the developing world and turned all his 
assignments into journeys of discovery. His 
observational and evaluative skills are in evidence 
throughout his writings, especially the irreverent 
evaluation classic that he authored following a 
worldwide tour that he had carefully planned to 
probe the diverse dilemmas faced in the design 
and implementation of development projects 
(Hirschman, 1995).  
This extraordinary book remains unrivalled as 
a source of knowledge and inspiration for the foot 
soldiers of the evaluation profession. Like all 
evaluators, Hirschman avoided sweeping policy 
generalizations and preferred to scrutinize the 
unique constellation of factors that make up 
individual social interventions. Yet by recollecting 
in tranquility about his observations, he was 
uniquely able in his own words to “snatch 
systematic insight from casual hindsight”. 
Dissecting the mechanisms of social change in the 
way that he did is evaluation at its very best. So 
yes, over his objections, it is high time for Albert O. 
Hirschman to be inducted in the Evaluation Hall 
of Fame. 
 
Are	  Hirschman’s	  ideas	  relevant	  to	  the	  
evaluation	  discipline?	  
 
In the same spirit of dialectic exploration, this 
article tests whether Hirschman’s pragmatic 
approach lives up to Keynes’ conception of 
economics as a useful discipline akin to dentistry 
(Keynes, 1931).  Are Hirschman’s diverse and 
cogent concepts serviceable as policy evaluation 
tools? Can they clarify the role of evaluation in 
development? Can they contribute to its methods? 
To address these questions this article evokes 
three mental models that lie at the core of 
Hirschman’s multi-faceted interpretation of the 
development experience: 
 
1. The hiding hand principle holds that 
underestimating the costs and difficulties of a 
development venture can be providential since 
it induces worthwhile action through error by 
agents who routinely underestimate their own 
creative energies and adaptive capacities.  
2. Hirschman contrasts trait making with trait 
taking, i.e. development interventions that 
seek major changes in strategies and processes 
with those that simply replicate and upscale 
successful local innovations.  
3. The influential exit, voice and loyalty triptych 
distinguishes between distinct responses to 
decline in firms, organizations and states: exit 
which involves the swift shifting of one’s 
allegiance; voice which refers to ‘kicking up a 
fuss’ and loyalty which defines the extent to 
which exit is delayed to allow time for 
recuperation mechanisms to take hold.  
 
Do these concepts throw light on development 
evaluation methods and models?  
 
The	  “hiding	  hand”	  and	  the	  benefits	  of	  
invisibility	  
 
First, I will describe the rationale of the “hiding 
hand” and probe its potential and limitations as an 
evaluation concept. It emerged out of Hirschman’s 
observations of development projects, their 
vagaries and their reversals. A playful variant of 
Adam Smith’s providential “hidden hand”, the 
“hiding hand” posits that under uncertainty, lack 
of foresight is a blessing in disguise: “the hiding 
hand does its work essentially through ignorance 
of ignorance, of uncertainties and of difficulties” 
(Hirschman, 1967, p. 35). If as development 
decision makers we underestimate our 
resourcefulness and creativity, “it is desirable that 
we underestimate to a roughly similar extent the 
difficulties of the tasks we face so as to be tricked 
by these two offsetting underestimates into 
undertaking tasks that we can, but otherwise 
would not dare, tackle” (Hirschman, 1995, p.13). 
While heavily criticized1 the “hiding hand” is 
an ingenious and perceptive depiction of the day to 
day travails routinely experienced in the design 
and implementation of development interventions. 
In complex operating environments, decision 
makers routinely misjudge situations and 
subsequently stumble from error to truth and from 
mistake to recovery. From Hirschman’s 
perspective, the “hiding hand” is a useful stimulant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 	  In	   the	   preface	   to	   the	   1995	   edition	   of	   Development	  
Projects	   Observed	   Hirschman	   stated	   the	   metaphor	   had	  
been	  intended	  as	  a	  mere	  provocation	  designed	  to	  evince	  a	  
sense	   of	   wonder	   and	   mystery	   about	   the	   development	  
experience.	   Looking	   back,	   this	   unnecessary	   confession	  
was	  probably	  made	  tongue	  in	  cheek.	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since as human experience suggests a vast store of 
capabilities usually lies untapped and can be 
summoned when needed to induce corrective 
activities.   But is this assumption always valid? Is 
the response elicited by setbacks invariably equal 
or superior to the challenges faced by development 
practitioners?  
 At the level of national economies, a large 
reserve of energy and talent often comes into the 
open following natural or man-made emergencies. 
Witness the remarkable recoveries of many 
disadvantaged regions following bouts of financial 
distress, natural disasters or violent conflict. But 
numerous counter-examples can also be brought 
to bear. While a vast policy research literature 
points to some remarkable returns to normalcy 
following a natural disaster, the overall record is 
gloomy (Harris, Keen & Mitchell, 2013).  
The hiding hand reflects Hirschman’s “bias for 
hope”.  But in the real world hope is not always 
rewarded. One is therefore driven to draw a two by 
two matrix that relates the intensity of the risks 
with the capacity to handle them (Table 1). For 
example, more often than not natural disasters 
exacerbate preexisting conflicts.  Especially in 
weak states, they deepen grievances, create 
opportunities for illegal activities, increase 
horizontal inequalities and raise the risks of 
corruption associated with sudden increases in 
international aid flows.  The stark reality is that 
initial conditions do matter and that the 
authorizing environment is not always 
characterized by a willingness to serve citizens or 
protect the poor. 
 
Table 1: Risks and rewards of external intervention 
following complex emergencies 
 
 To be sure, the “hiding hand” does induce 
interventions that would not otherwise have taken 
place in high risk circumstances. Without it, no 
large and ambitious undertaking such as 
Christopher Columbus’ voyage or the construction 
of railways across the United States would have 
materialized. In development this is highly 
desirable for cases that fit in the northeast corner 
of Table 1 but not for those that belong in the 
southwest corner. Of course, development aid 
differs from humanitarian assistance in that it 
aims to increase both the willingness and the 
capacity of countries to address their development 
problems. Thus, one may be able to induce 
institutional changes or forge coalitions that 
induce movement from the south and/or the west 
to the northeast.  
Getting there calls on the mobilization of other 
Hirschman concepts. But before calling on them it 
is appropriate to outline the logic used by 
evaluators to assess the effectiveness of 
development interventions. First, they test the 
relevance of goals. Second, they examine the 
likelihood of achieving them (efficacy). Third, they 
assess whether resources have been used 
economically (efficiency). At the design stage, 
goals are agreed and the content of the 
intervention is defined.  
Good ex ante evaluation practice instructs 
designers to consider the values and interests of all 
stakeholders so as to maximize the relevance of the 
intervention in the public interest. At the 
implementation phase on the other hand efficacy, 
i.e. the capabilities required to achieve the agreed 
goals comes to the centre stage. Thus, satisfactory 
development outcomes are associated with 
interventions that achieve their relevant objectives 
efficiently.  
 
Trait	  Taking	  and	  Trait	  Making	  
 
The concept of relevance is what most 
distinguishes evaluation from auditing since 
evaluators take explicit account of stakeholders’ 
values and interests, whereas auditors tend to take 
goals for granted. Evaluation tackles the dilemma 
of assessing the relevance of development 
interventions frontally. This is the domain of 
situation analyses—the first phase of formative 
evaluation. 
Typically some stakeholders will view local 
habits and processes as appropriate to the context 
and worthy of protection. Such stakeholders favor 
trait taking interventions that accept wholesale 
most of the constraints imposed by the socio-
political context, the local culture, the prevailing 
customs, and so on.  This is consistent with a low 
risk approach to development assistance. In some 
circumstances, it deprives developing countries’ 
citizens of the bracing effects of innovation 
 High domestic 
capacity to 











and low risks 
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secured through external injections of ideas and 
skills.  
Other stakeholders advocate trait making. 
They proceed on the assumption that changes in 
local mores and time-honored practices are the 
way to achieve rapid progress. They promote a 
frontal attack on all the technological and 
institutional obstacles perceived to stand in the 
way of development. In a headlong pursuit of 
rapid change, they advocate filling gaps in capital 
assets and technologies through imports and 
overcoming skills gaps and management 
weaknesses through access to external technical 
assistance.  
This approach is riskier since it may not take 
adequate account of local voices and in extreme 
cases it may stunt local initiative, undercut 
incentives to learn and encourage dependency on 
outsiders. Whether the trait makers, who argue 
for major changes in the ways things are done or 
the trait takers, who argue for sticking with 
existing practices should control the design of the 
intervention depends on the characteristics of the 
operating environment.  
If the institutional context is rigid, leadership 
skills are in short supply, and domestic capacities 
are scarce trait making may be too risky. Not so if 
leaders are willing to take and manage risks and if 
the society has ample hidden resources that can be 
summoned and brought to bear in short order so 
as to overcome unforeseen development obstacles. 
In such cases, trait making is a good bet.  Latitude 
is the Hirschman concept that best captures these 
contextual characteristics. It is used in Table 2 to 
identify the balance of risks and rewards involved 
in innovative trait making. Narrow latitude 
environments are inimical to change. Broad 
latitude environments are receptive to trait 
making change. 
 





Evaluation	  as	  a	  complement	  to	  the	  
“hiding	  hand”	  	  
 
I will now show how evaluation is itself an 
attribute or a function that vastly improves the 
effectiveness of responses by guiding the periodic 
re-design of development interventions in 
response to unforeseen or evolving circumstances. 
In other words, evaluation complements the 
“hiding hand” by helping to manage risks, design 
recuperative interventions and contribute to 
creative adaptation to evolving conditions by 
striking the right balance between trait taking and 
trait making. 
More often than not, the development context
 is volatile and uncertainties abound. In such 
circumstances an important attribute is the resolve 
and capacity of actors responsible for the 
intervention to adapt the goals and the design 
parameters of the intervention including the 
extent to which, based on early experience some 
trait making, features can be introduced and 
others withdrawn and replaced by existing traits. 
This assumes of course that the inherent nature of 
the intervention or the operating context do not 
impose tight latitude constraints on what to do 
and how to go about it.  The more complex and 
uncertain the operating environment is the greater 
the value of adaptability.   
The numerous portfolio evaluation reports 
prepared by the World Bank and other 
development assistance agencies amply 
demonstrate that the vast majority of development 
projects have to be restructured at least once in 
mid-course (often more often) so that they may 
succeed.  This is because it is a frequent 
occurrence that the naïve and misleading 
assumptions embedded in the original 
intervention need to be corrected.  Hence, 
adaptability presumes a capacity for summative 
evaluation combined with formative evaluation in 
real time. Whereas summative evaluations help to 
ascertain whether interventions are still worth 
implementing, formative evaluations help shape 
the restructuring of troubled interventions and the 
design of new interventions.  
Once goals are set and a relevant design is 
approved, the implementation phase gets 
underway. This calls on vastly different skills and 
capabilities than those required at the design 
phase. Whereas managers are given wide latitude 
at the design phase, they are subjected to narrower 
latitude constraints at the implementation phase.  
It is the combination of adaptability associated 
with wide latitude tasks and discipline associated 
with narrow latitude tasks that generates 
 Broad latitude 
of operating 
environment 
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development effectiveness – the economic 
achievement of relevant goals (Table 3). 
 




At the goal setting and design phase, decision 
makers must rely on political savvy, principled 
mediation, creativity, innovation and adaptability. 
At the implementation phase, different 
requirements are needed since project execution 
involves operational planning, coordination, 
human resource management, choice of 
contractors, quality assurance, etc.  Attention to 
detail and above all discipline are critical so that 
agreed schedules are met, costs are minimized and 
intended outcomes are secured.  
Monitoring informed by evaluation (i.e. real 
time evaluation) is a key management instrument 
at the implementation phase. The overarching goal 
is to ensure that the main relevant goals of the 
intervention have been achieved. This 
performance criterion is called efficacy while 
efficiency has to do with the economy of resources 
used to achieve the goals. It is the combination of 
adaptability associated with the creative wide 
latitude phase and the discipline associated with 
the narrow latitude phase that generates 
development effectiveness—the economic 
achievement of relevant goals. 
 
Linking	  the	  “hiding	  hand”	  principle	  
with	  the	  latitudes	  and	  disciplines	  
model	  	  
 
Realist evaluators have long pointed out that 
context is as important as process in generating 
outcomes from development interventions. 
Unsurprisingly, ingenious and timely responses 
are most likely to be evinced in contexts where the 
profile of sponsors is high, the risks of failure are 
close to unacceptable and the damages that poor 
performance will inflict on reputations and career 
are significant.  
It follows that the beneficial effects of the 
“hiding hand” are especially pronounced in 
authorizing environments characterized by 
transparency, independent evaluation and 
contestability at all stages of the intervention cycle. 
This is how initial misjudgments are best 
identified and corrected and the veil of mistaken 
assumptions is lifted so that projects can be 
restructured in a timely way in order to deliver 
their intended results efficiently.  
By brazenly appearing to tolerate carelessness 
in the formulation of projects, the “hiding hand 
principle” when it was first unveiled by Hirschman 
was stoutly and understandably resisted by 
development practitioners not only because it 
seemed to invite the assumption of unnecessary 
risks but also because it could easily be perceived 
as an inducement to complacency and consequent 
neglect of risks, for example, in conflicted or 
disaster prone environments (Adelman, 2013).  
For development decision makers, it stands to 
reason that good practice dictates the provision of 
contingencies in cost estimates, the inclusion of 
ample redundancies in engineering designs, the 
deliberate selection of contractors and suppliers 
qualified by experience to deal with unexpected 
mishaps as well as the use of reasoned conflict 
assessments prior to engagement with fragile 
situations.  
These are sound operational principles: 
prudence is a characteristic of good development 
management. But risk management should not be 
confused with risk aversion. Indeed, the hiding 
hand points to the limitations of evaluation models 
that give priority to the achievement of pre-
determined goals rather than to the evolving 
relevance of intervention goals and designs that 
help deal with risks. In fact the hiding hand model 
illustrates a well-known lesson of business 
management: high risks and high rewards 
sometimes go together so that the “hiding hand” 
makes embarking on ambitious and 
transformative development ventures more likely 
than would otherwise be the case.  
 
The	  Benefits	  of	  Timely	  Visibility	  
 
This lesson is far reaching since it argues for a 
dynamic view of the development process. Given 
the difficulty faced in comparing development 
rewards across sectors and types of activities, 
practitioners routinely fall back on performance 
based decision making which is predicated on the 
 High 
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notion that past is prologue—a manifestation of 
suboptimal risk averting management cultures.  
In development, an excessively conservative 
stance underlies the phenomenon of “aid darlings” 
and “aid orphans.” Giving excessive weight to past 
performance in aid allocations has contributed to 
this problem. Thus, Andrew Rogerson and 
Susanne Steensen (2009) note that 
 
Behind these benchmarks lies an ongoing 
debate about the significance of past 
country performance ratings as a valid 
predictor of future poverty outcomes and 
it is now widely accepted that this 
relationship is not straightforward. For 
example in the case of fragile states low 
institutional capacity in the recovery phase 
can be seen more as a leveraging 
opportunity than as a deterrent (p.1).  
 
Performance based aid allocations widely used 
by aid donors fly in the face of ample policy 
research evidence to the effect that the largest 
rewards from aid are to be found in vulnerable 
situations (Guillaumont & Chauvet, 2001). To be 
sure, not all development stories in risky 
environments have a happy ending. But the 
chances of positive outcomes are vastly improved 
when relevant information is publicly available 
about the costs and benefits of projects and their 
indirect as well as secondary consequences.  
In fact, the routine and unglamorous tasks of 
inspection and auditing play a very useful role in 
allowing project owners and stakeholders to peek 
behind the “hiding hand”. With respect to social 
and environmental aspects, non-governmental 
organizations play a similar role. It is through such 
fiduciary and contestability functions 
complemented by evaluation that the negative 
effects of the “hiding hand” are mitigated and that 
public pressures for remedial or compensatory 
measures affecting “problem projects” build up. 
These dynamics underlie the reversal in the 
deteriorating trends of development initiatives 
through intensified implementation efforts or a 
reorientation of the original scheme.  In sum, it is 
the visibility of performance shortfalls that 
encourages the design of corrective actions in 
learning environments.  
Paradoxically therefore, the benefits of the 
“hiding hand” derived from operating in high risks 
and high rewards contexts are amplified when 
transparency penetrates the darkest recesses of the 
operating environment since this is where major 
hindrances to development effectiveness lurk. In 
other words, it is the dialectic of light and darkness 
that help to tap the beneficial effects of the hiding 
hand. Only through visibility is public attention 
eventually drawn to the defects of worthwhile 
projects that would never have been undertaken 
had their downside risks been visible at the outset. 
Visibility leads to public scrutiny facilitated by 
independent inspection and evaluation as well as 
accountability for results buttressed by contractual 
arrangements.  
In sum, as confirmed by numerous 
development evaluations, positive outcomes are 
more likely to take place in organizational 
environments characterized by transparency and 
contestability. Thus, the paradox of visibility turns 
out to be the essential corollary of the “hiding 
hand” principle. Through visibility, the latitude for 
performance shortfalls is narrowed and forward 
and backward linkages are identified to help 
reshape imperfectly designed operations and 
achieve worthwhile development outcomes.  
Ironically, therefore, the “hiding hand” works 
best if it prevails at the outset and eventually gives 
way to let the light in. This “sleight of hand” 
maneuver allows the generation of early 
enthusiasm for ambitious projects approved in the 
twilight of necessarily imperfect information to be 
followed by a thorough reconsideration of the 
innocent assumptions that generated them and 
their virtuous re-design in the harsh light of 
experience. To paraphrase the great poet John 
Milton, in the business of development, timely 
transparency is the singular virtue that makes 
“darkness visible.” 
 
Exit,	  Voice,	  and	  Loyalty	  
 
It is now time to turn to Hirschman’s celebrated 
exit, voice and loyalty model. It throws evaluative 
light on how stakeholders react to performance 
shortfalls by firms, organizations, and states. The 
exit option is central to economic theory. It calls 
on customers to abstain from purchasing products 
that are too costly or of inadequate quality so that 
as demand for the outputs of inefficient suppliers 
vanishes and only efficient producers survive. This 
market mechanism is individualistic, impersonal, 
and indirect. Under precise and idealistic 
conditions of effective exchange (including perfect 
competition), it leads to optimal outcomes for the 
society.  
By contrast, the voice option is the domain of 
politics. It is amplified by participation and works 
best where visibility is present, that is, in 
governance environments that combine 
accountability, transparency, and the rule of law.  
Voice may be conceived either as an alternative or 
a supplement to exit (e.g. through boycotts). It 
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allows customers and other stakeholders to 
express their views and exercise influence through 
protest, advice, voting, or representation. Through 
diverse voice instruments, improved performance 
and higher value of goods and services is 
expected.2 
The third leg of the stool is loyalty—the 
tendency to give suppliers the benefit of the doubt 
through postponement of exit. Loyalty gives 
breathing space to policy makers. It helps to 
sustain hope in difficult circumstances. Exit 
retarding behavior occurs when expectations 
about improvements triggered by voice ride high. 
Loyalty supports the “hiding hand” since it 
conceals the obstacles that lie in the way of 
regeneration. It is enhanced by cultural symbols 
and sustained by habit, reputation and attachment 
to shared values. It is associated with respect for 
tradition, precedent and social hierarchy.  
This seminal trio of concepts emerged when 
Hirschman observed that a Nigerian railways 
project had failed to overcome its glaring 
inefficiencies despite active competition from 
trucks. It transpired that the ready availability of 
an alternative transport mode had facilitated 
customers’ exodus from the railways and deprived 
its management of the feedback that would have 
been prevalent had the customers been securely 
locked in.   
In other words, exit had dampened public 
reactions by muting the voice option while railway 
users’ loyalty to the institution, weakened by years 
of poor and unreliable service, did not delay exit 
long enough to make space for gradual reform of 
railways policies and practices. Users’ easy access 
to the exit option dampened the propensity to 
protest in ways that would inevitably have 
materialized absent an exit option.  
The counterfactual is that in the absence of a 
road transport alternative such protests especially 
from influential users would have induced 
management to take corrective action. In addition, 
access to government subsidies had compensated 
for the revenue losses resulting from customers’ 
switch to another transport mode and hindered 
managerial reform incentives.  
Choosing the right admixture of exit, voice and 
loyalty in designing interventions is the central 
challenge of public policy since the objective of 
sound governance is to help the society sustain 
shocks, produce self-correcting behaviors and/or 
elicit effective contributions from existing or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2In some circumstances, consumers or employees may 
take over the entire enterprise and manage it 
collaboratively through voluntary action.  
potential participants in order to sustain 
development.  
 
Evaluation	  as	  an	  Antidote	  to	  Fads	  
 
How then does the exit-voice-loyalty triad connect 
with evaluation? In a nutshell, evaluation makes 
responses to declining performance more effective. 
First, it facilitates exit where necessary. Second, it 
amplifies voice where appropriate. Third, it sets 
judicious limits on loyalty. In some contexts 
loyalty is close to absolute, that is, exit is treated as 
treason and forbidden, irrespective of 
performance. Such is the organizational culture 
that favors slavish compliance with the latest fad. 
This phenomenon is all too prevalent in 
government and business where wave after wave 
of management fads have come and gone: 
Management by Objectives, Total Quality 
Management, Balanced Score Cards, Knowledge 
Management, Big Data Analytics, etc.   
Heady enthusiasm for a fad (e.g. integrated 
rural development) does not tolerate dissent and 
suppresses voice as well as exit. It prevents 
adaptation to the local context until the grim 
reality of the situation is such that deep 
disenchantment eventually takes over. This lays 
the groundwork for yet another fad (e.g. the 
Training and Visit agricultural extension system) 
that is usually ill fated as well so that the process of 
new fads replacing old fads goes on.  
The disastrous cyclical pattern of fads is rooted 
in a blind faith towards innovation as a central 
objective of policy. To be sure, economic 
productivity will not grow without innovation. But 
not all innovations are in the public interest and 
even the most successful innovations are 
necessarily disruptive. While they benefit some 
entrepreneurs, they hurt existing firms and their 
employees, make the existing capital stock 
redundant, affect market structures, and render 
existing processes and products obsolete.  
Economists such as Joseph Schumpeter 
perceive such creative destruction as the price that 
must be paid to secure the benefits of a capitalist 
economy. Evaluation makes exit from fads more 
likely. It does so by amplifying the voice of 
beneficiaries and by accelerating social learning. 
Specifically, it decreases the costs and increases 
the rewards of voice and reduces the need for 
premature and disruptive exit by showing the way 
towards adapted intervention designs. It amplifies 
users’ voices, accelerates exit from doomed 
innovations and encourages adaptation of 
externally imposed models to take account of local 
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realities – i.e. by helping to strike the right balance 
between trait taking and trait making.  
Purely economic models assume that markets 
function smoothly. All economic agents are 
supposed to behave rationally. The models do not 
incorporate transaction costs. They take no 
account of the inefficiencies imposed by 
monopolies and oligopolies. This helps explain 
why simulating market mechanisms in the public 
sector is fraught with difficulties and why 
management fads fare worse in the public sector 
than in the private sector.  
In the public sector when voice fails to deliver, 
chronic disappointment risks a crisis of faith or a 
wholesale rebellion against the existing order 
occasioning wholesale exit from a program that 
may lead to high social disruption and prohibitive 
costs. Equally, exit operating on its own is not 
sufficient to generate a positive outcome since 
absent voice the capacity to adapt is limited by 
information asymmetry.  
 
Using	  the	  Exit-­‐Voice-­‐Loyalty	  Construct	  
to	  Make	  Effective	  Use	  of	  Evaluation	  	  
 
The exit-voice- loyalty model also helps to manage 
the evaluation function. It does so by clarifying the 
comparative advantages of the social science 
disciplines on which evaluation depends. 
Evaluation is at its best when it transgresses 
disciplinary boundaries and bridges three distinct 
intellectual traditions. The first one is held by 
economists, for whom exit is the most effective 
response to declining performance of firms, 
organizations and states.  For them, competition is 
a uniquely useful recuperation mechanism when 
performance falters. This is because they believe 
that Adam Smith’s hidden hand generates socially 
useful ends as the indirect result of free-wheeling 
competition among large number of self-interested 
individuals and profit maximizing firms.  
By contrast, political scientists are partial to 
the voice option as a reform inducing mechanism 
especially in contexts where performance lapses 
plague organizations in the public, semi-public, or 
voluntary sectors. They are not altogether 
convinced that individuals and organizations are 
mostly driven by rationality or profit maximization 
goals. Being mostly preoccupied with the state and 
its relationships with citizens they assert that the 
logic of free market economics does not operate in 
situations where services are offered without direct 
monetary counterpart or where the state stands 
behind a large supplier of social services. 
Finally, sociologists and anthropologists 
concentrate on the loyalty dimension of 
Hirschman’s triangle. They probe the traditions, 
structures, and mechanisms that induce socially 
responsible behavior. They use social capital 
concepts to show how trust keeps transaction costs 
in check. They are vitally interested in the origins 
of customs and the motivations of individuals 
committed to their families’ and communities’ 
welfare. They examine the reasons why altruistic 
behavior within groups does not always hold 
among groups. In particular they study the 
circumstances where divergent group interests 
lead to social strife or violent conflict.  
If the Hirschman triangle is a powerful 
evaluative tool, it is because it puts all social 
science disciplines to work. The exit-voice-loyalty 
trilogy induces evaluators to overcome the cultural 
idiosyncrasies and intellectual biases associated 
with parsimonious silo thinking. Here as 
elsewhere Hirschman’s uniquely nimble 
intellectual approach spans disciplines. Applying 
the famous trilogy to evaluation is instructive. 
First, evaluation approaches and models favored 
by economists are partial to the exit option. 
Experimental methods and cost benefit analysis 
simulate a market mechanism. They conceive of 
policy making as the outcome of a competitive 
process that helps to shed unproductive 
interventions and keeps resources flowing towards 
economically productive programs. 
Conversely, evaluators schooled in political 
science emphasize the voice option. They tend to 
favor participatory and democratic evaluation 
models that rely on improving the interplay 
between policy makers and citizens through the 
generation and dissemination of valid knowledge 
and the amplification of underprivileged groups. 
Finally, sociologists and anthropologists turned 
evaluators favor adaptive forms of social 
intervention and bring out the unique role that the 
social context plays in shaping policy outcomes. 
They lean towards realist approaches that probe 
how loyalty to a group or a world view can trump 
self-interest and influence the political process.   
In the real world of practice, the selection of 
one or more evaluation models is guided by the 
nature of the entity being evaluated and the 
characteristics of the authorizing environment. 
Accordingly, the exit, voice and loyalty trilogy 
helps to fight disciplinary bias. Specifically it helps 
to guide the design of evaluations in judicious 
ways. This leads us to yet another 2x2 matrix that 
relates different evaluation models to diverse 
organizations in terms of their sensitivity to exit 
and voice mechanisms (Table 4). 
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Table 4: Choice of evaluation models 
 
 Entities being evaluated react 
strongly to exit  
Entities being evaluated react weakly 
to exit  
Entities being 
evaluated react 
strongly to voice  
Evaluands: Social programs in 
liberal democracies, voluntary 
associations evaluation 
Evaluation models: mix of 
models, goal free evaluation, 
democratic evaluation 
Evaluands: Developmental states, 
local communities:  
Evaluation models: participatory 
evaluation, empowerment evaluation 
Entities being 
evaluated react 
weakly to voice 
Evaluands: Illiberal democracies 
and private corporations. 
Evaluation models: goal based  
models, experimental methods, 
market research, etc.  
Evaluands: authoritarian regimes, 
democracies captured by vested 
interests 
Evaluation models: transformative 




Pulling	  Things	  Together	  	  
 
It is time to tie the strands of my argument and 
draw the policy implications of Hirschman’s fertile 
evaluation ideas. First, I have argued that a 
shifting balance between concealment and 
visibility characterizes successful use of the “hiding 
hand” principle. Through it, the costs and risks are 
underestimated so as to generate broad based 
support for an ambitious venture. But as 
implementation proceeds and unexpected 
problems arise, corrective action guided by 
evaluation is needed in order to achieve 
development effectiveness.  
At that stage, visibility is critical since without 
a clear view of development obstacles, a 
transparent diagnostic of the weaknesses of the 
intervention cannot be rendered and suitable 
response mechanisms cannot be designed. Nor is 
visibility enhanced by evaluation sufficient on its 
own. Adaptation of operational designs will only 
materialize when participatory evaluation voice is 
triggered. This is especially likely to take place 
once a threshold of public dissatisfaction is 
crossed in response to the observed shortcomings 
of the venture and (assuming a responsive 
authorizing environment) once the unsatisfactory 
state of affairs made evident by evaluation 
convinces decision makers that adjustments in the 
development intervention are imperative.  
Hence, public disappointment emerges as a 
vital source of recuperative energy and as an 
incentive for policy reform in the development 
process. In such circumstances, visibility and 
disappointment are mutually reinforcing and they 
are made more effective by evaluation. Low 
tolerance for performance shortcomings generates 
frequent and intense disappointment. This goes 
together with a greater demand for visibility. 
Shortcomings made visible by principled and 
rigorous evaluation trigger earlier and sharper 
disappointments. Conversely, the demanding 
attitudes that generate and amplify 
disappointment induce more intrusive and nimble 
approaches to monitoring in order to illuminate 
implementation difficulties and facilitate timely 
corrective action.  
There are exceptions to this harmonious state 
of affairs. If disappointment is excessive and if 
evaluation is punitive and unfair, it can yield 
dysfunctional public responses. For example, 
ideologically driven evaluations may be make 
development costs more visible than development 
benefits and block the development process 
altogether through well-meaning but ultimately 
self-defeating boycotts and sanctions. Equally, 
where capacities for remedial measures are 
limited, high visibility combined with intense 
disappointment may put so much pressure on 
public authorities that no space is left for the 
authorities to adapt or improve the development 
design. Violence—an extreme form of exit and 
voice—may even be triggered. 
This is where resilience or the capacity to 
adapt to diverse ranges of latitudes comes in. 
Resilience is the societal characteristic that allows 
the collective stresses and pains inevitably 
associated with development to be absorbed 
without major upheavals. It requires a mix of 
public, private and voluntary action. All too often, 
these institutional approaches are perceived as 
competitive rather than complementary. Yet, 
resilient solutions to development problems are 
usually achieved through a mix of modes. The 
precise balance between exit, voice, and loyalty 
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depends on the mix of goods and services needed 
to sustain the momentum of development in 
particular contexts. 
In practice, the mix varies from sector to 
sector, place to place, and time to time. Different 
admixtures are needed depending on the stage of 
development and the latitudes to declines in 
performance of the society. Whereas strong states 
are energized by the powerful pressures brought 
about by globalization, fragile states may wither or 
fail when brutally exposed to the winds of global 
competition. This is why for example it was 
counterproductive to impose blue print policy 
solutions (e.g. “The Washington Consensus”) 
across diverse developing country contexts during 
the adjustment era of the late twentieth century. 
It is also why, rather than succumbing to the 
lure of fads, reasoned adaptation to new trends 
guided by evaluation is at the core of effective 
development policy. Getting everything done at 
once through trait making is an ideal that does not 
fit the reality of constrained operating 
environments where resources are scarce and 
priorities must be set. Nor is stubborn opposition 
to external stimuli conducive to development. 
Sequencing of policy actions is needed to generate 
the critical mass of inputs needed to trigger 
progress within a constrained budget.  
Hence, scarce resources should not privilege 
the generation of private goods at the expense of 
public goods or the regeneration of common pool 
resources. A balanced approach requires the build-
up of government capacities for the supply of 
public goods, a process described in Hirschman’s 
treatise on private interest and public action 
(Hirschman, 1982). Voluntary action may also 
need to be summoned in order to achieve the 
cooperative actions needed for environmental 
sustainability. The strategy in order to be 
successful requires the assembly of tailor made 
political coalitions needed to overcome the 
opposition of vested interests.  
Thus, development is likely to proceed in a 
crablike pattern that oscillates between the 
antagonistic pressures of distinct social groups. 
Retrogression in one sector will generate 
countervailing forces that will for a time call for 
reorientation of the ship of state towards new 
horizons. Assuming the ship of the state has not 
been captured by vested interests the development 
trajectory will resemble the tacking pattern used 
by experienced sailors who sailing against the 
wind are able to reach port safely.  In the stormy 
and volatile global economy of an interconnected 
world, shifting reliance on public, private, and 
voluntary action is the way to pilot the ship of state 
and evaluation is the lighthouse that ensures that 
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3 In writing this paper, I was reminded of Albert O. 
Hirschman’s notion that the most significant and 
durable effect of ideas may be indirect. This is the 
recruitment effect, as opposed to the direct, persuasion 
effect of ideas. By implicitly giving allure and impetus to 
development thinking we can thank Hirschman not in 
having solved all the problems of the fledgling 
evaluation discipline “but in having contributed to 
attracting into our field a large number of people who 
will carry on”  (Hirschman, 1992, p.34).  
	  
